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COMMENTS
COPYRIGHT-NOTICE REQUIREMENTS-PITFALLS FOR THE

UN-

WARY*-lt is established law that an author has a common-law copyright in his work when the work is created, and that this copyright
is lost when the work is published.1 He may still, however, be protected under the United States copyright statutes if he gives copyright notice when he publishes a work. 2 This notice must be in
the form and place prescribed by the statutes; the creation of a
copyright is said to be conditioned upon the use of proper notice
inscribed upon every copy published.3
The main shortcoming of the statutory requirements of copyright notice is that failure to meet these requirements may deprive
an author of his property in his works without the public gaining
any substantial benefit from his loss. These statutory requirements may unnecessarily operate as pitfalls for the unwary.4 Most
frequently these situations are brought to light when copies of the
work are published with no copyright notice whatsoever5 or when
the notice used does not conform exactly to the statutory requirements which dictate where the notice is to be placed0 and what
form7 the notice is to take. Both situations have elicited comments
• This article is a revision of an essay which was awarded the First Prize in the 1960
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at The University of Michigan Law School. It is
published here through the courtesy of the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers.-Ed.
1 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899); Egner v. E. C. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F.2d
398 (1st Cir. 1943); Wrench v. Universal Pictures Co., 104 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
2 There are several methods provided for creation of copyright under the statutes. If
the work is to be published, the method to be used by United States citizens and certain
others is prescribed by 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1958): "Any person entitled thereto by this title
may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with notice of copyright required
by this title; and such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered
for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor, except in the case
of books seeking ad interim protection under section 22 of this title." Ad interim protec•
tion is very limited in scope, but copyright notice need not be inscribed in the work to
gain this protection. However, the clause of § 16 that frees 1500 copies of the work from
the manufacturing clause demands that notice be inscribed on each of the 1500 copies.
If the term of copyright is to be extended to the full 28 years, § 23 demands that all
notice requirements be met. If the work is not to be reproduced for sale, a copyright may
be obtained in the work without the use of a copyright notice, under the rules set forth in
§ 12. Foreign citizens must look to § 9 for the notice requirements that apply to their works.
s Mifflin v. Dutten, 190 U.S. 265 (1903); De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker &: Kessler, 235 U.S.
33, 36 (1914).
4 See generally Finkelstein, The Copyright Law-A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REv.
1025 (1956); SOLBERG, CoPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS- 1789-1904 (1905); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
GENERAL REvISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAw, STUDY No. 6, NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT (1958)
[hereinafter cited as NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT]; Halliday, Losing Copyrights Under the Law
of the United States, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 343 (1953).
6 17 U.S.C. § IO (1958); see note 2 supra.
617 U.S.C. § 9(c), § 20 (1958).
7 17 U.S.C. § 9 (c), § 19 (1958).
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from the judiciary that the statutory requirements must be com•
plied with strictly,8 although the modern trend may be to require
a lesser degree of compliance.0 Whatever the judicial trend, a sub•
stantial number of authors and other unwary proprietors of copy•
rightable subject matter have lost their property rights by inad•
vertently publishing without notice or by failing to use copyright
notice conforming to the statutory requirements. Moreover,
further problems have arisen since the Supreme Court in Mazer v.
Stein10 extended copyright protection to a great variety of works
which had not previously been afforded protection.
Whether judicial remedy of the situation will be adequate or
whether legislative change is necessary to remedy the situation
presents another problem; but the need for remedy seems clear.
The purpose of this comment is to discuss these pitfalls and to
indicate present judicial trends regarding these problems. Pro•
posed remedies, both legislative and judicial, will be listed and
evaluated where possible.

I.

THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY COPYRIGHT NOTICE

When a work is first published with no copyright notice appear•
ing upon the work, judicial decisions have consistently held that
the work has fallen into the public domain; 11 the author is said to
have "dedicated" his work to the public.12 Moreover, this principle
also applies to every subsequent publication of the work.13
s See authorities cited in note 3 supra, and Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing &:
Publishing Co., 294 Fed. 430 (8th Cir. 1923): Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Anderson, 144
F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1944).
O Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp. 292, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); NoTICE
OF CorYRIGHT I I.
10 347 U.S. 201 (1954); for more complete discussion of this case and the problems
arising thereunder, see the text accompanying notes 72-93 infra.
11 The loss of copyright most often lamented in this area is that of Oliver Wendell
Holmes when it was held that his Autocrat of the Breakfast Table had fallen into the
public domain because it had been first published in a periodical- The Atlantic Monthlywhich bore no notice of copyright. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
12 Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 Fed. 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), afj'd,
218 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1914); Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935); see National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952),
where Judge Learned Hand differentiated between the "abandonment" or "dedication"
of property and the "forfeiture" thereof, saying that both "abandonment" and "forfeiture"
necessitate an overt and intentional act, whereas "forfeiture" does not involve intent and
is the proper term to use here. Whatever the term used, the result is the same - the work
is in the public domain if published without notice of copyright.
13 17 U.S.C. § IO (1958), quoted in note 2 supra. See also De Jonge v. Breuker &
Kessler, 235 U.S. 33, 36 (1914) (wrapping-paper design) where it was held that notice must
appear on every reproduction of the work.
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These basic principles were reiterated by Judge Learned Hand
in 1951 in the influential case of National Comics Publications,
Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.14 -the "Superman" case. In that
case the court held that when several strips of the Superman comic
were published without notice appearing on the strips, the copyright in these strips was forfeited; however, those strips which did
bear notice were validly copyrighted. Section 21 of the Copyright
Law15 was held inapplicable for it is designed only to prevent the
loss of copyright when the proprietor accidentally omits notice
from "a particular copy or copies" of the work, but has otherwise
sought to comply with the notice requirements; the section could
have no application where all copies of a particular strip were
without notice. Even when applicable the proprietor has only a
limited remedy against an innocent infringer who has been misled
by the omission of notice. Moreover, this section has been held to
apply only where a very few copies were involved16 and has generally provided relief for the proprietor only where there has been
an "occasional" omission.17 Recently, however, this section has
been applied rather liberally1 8 and it may be that in the future
section 21 can be construed to indicate a general statutory intent to
prevent loss of copyright where the proprietor has shown that he
has sought to comply with the statutory requirements.19
The need for notice upon works published abroad seems to be
present also. Although dicta in the case of Heim v. Universal
Pictures20 indicated that notice upon works first published outside
the United States was not a condition precedent to protection by
a United States copyright, the United States adherence to the Universal Copyright Convention21 arguably vitiates that dicta both as
14191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952) [hereinafter referred to as the Superman case]. For a detailed discussion of the case, see Reeves,
Superman v. Captain Marvel; Or Loss of Literary Property in Comic Strips, 5 A.S.C.A.P.
CoPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 3 (1952).
15 17 U.S.C. § 21 (1958). The Copyright Law is Title 17 of the United States Code.
16 Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579, 581 (3d Cir. 1941).
17 Judge Hand held that the omission in the Superman case was not such an "occasional" omission.
18 In Christie v. Raddock, 169 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the plaintiff deposited
three copies of his doctorate thesis in public libraries without notice on the copies. Later,
the work was published in abridged form with notice. In granting the preliminary injunction, the court held that § 21 would apply even if the copy the defendant had copied
from bore no notice.
19 See Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1613 (1960).
20 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
21 See generally KUPFERMAN & FoNER, UNIVERSAL CoPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED
(1955).
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to works published in countries adhering to the Convention22 and
in countries remaining outside the Convention.23 The Copyright
Office, in its regulations24 has indicated it will not be bound by the
Heim dicta and will refuse to register claims of copyright in works
not bearing adequate copyright notice at the time of their first
publication.25
II.

WHERE THE WORK Is PUBLISHED WITH DEFECTIVE
COPYRIGHT NOTICE

It is necessary for a United States citizen or domiciliary or one
who first publishes in the United States to use the form of notice
prescribed in section 19 of the Copyright Law26 to obtain a valid
copyright, and he must use the placement of the notice prescribed
in section 20 of the Copyright Law.27 Others must use either the
form and placement prescribed in section 9(c) or that provided for
in presidential proclamations issued pursuant to section 9(b).28

A. Defects in Form of Notice
It was once said that the form requirements of the copyright
statutes29 were mandatory and had to be strictly complied with in
order to prevent a work from falling into public domain. 30 It
seems that the trend of the recent decisions has been toward a more
lenient interpretation of the statutes. The test usually applied
22 A list of countries which have adhered to the Universal Copyright Convention
appears following 17 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp. I, 1959).
23 See Katz, Is Notice of Copyright Necessary in Works Published Abroad- a Query
and a Quandary, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 55, 88; Cary, The United States and Universal Copyright: An Analysis of Public Law 743, in KuPFERMAN & FoNER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 83,
91.
24 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (a) (3) (1960).
25 See Cary, Proposed New Copyright Office Regulations, 6 BuLL. CoPYRIGHT Soc'y
213 (1959).
26 17 u.s.c. § 19 (1958).
27 17 u.s.c. § 20 (1958).
2817 u.s.c. § 9 (b) (1958). See generally 2 I.ADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 701, 702 (1938).
20 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1958): "The notice of copyright required by section 10 of this Title
shall consist either of the word 'Copyright', the abbreviation 'Copr.', or the symbol @,
accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor, and if the work be a printed
literary, musical, or dramatic work, the notice shall include also the year in which the
copyright was secured by publication. In the case, however, of copies of works specified
in sub-sections (f) to (k), inclusive, of section 5 of this title, the notice may consist of the
letter C enclosed within a circle, thus @, accompanied by the initials, monogram, mark,
or symbol of the copyright proprietor: Provided, that on some accessible portion of such
copies or of the margin, back, permanent base, or pedestal, or of the substance on which
such copies shall be mounted, his name shall appear••.•"
so See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
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today 1s whether the notice substantially complies with the
statute.31 Or, stated in another way, notice satisfies the statutory
requirements if it provides notice of the copyright to "anyone
looking for the truth and desiring to avoid infringement."32
There are still pitfalls to be found in the form requirements and
these must be examined.
I. The Date of Publication. Section 19 provides several
choices concerning the content of the notice. Classification is important because the notice must include the name of the copyright
proprietor and the date of publication if it is a "printed literary,
musical, or dramatic work," but the date need not appear on those
works listed in subsection (f) through (k) of section 5.33 Although
most articles should easily fall into one of the listed categories, and
although the regulations of the Copyright Office34 afford further
help, certain works, such as the comic strips involved in the Superman case,35 defy classification. A mistake in classification is not
fatal, however, for section 5 provides that no "error in classification
[shall] invalidate or impair the copyright protection secured under
this title. " 36
If the work falls into a classification demanding that the date
of publication be included in the notice, the proprietor of the work
faces the problem of deciding what that date is. Section 26 defines
the term "the date of publication" to be "the earliest date when
copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale, sold, or
publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under
31 Superman case, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1952), where Judge Hand observed at 602: "[S]ince the purpose of the notice is to advise
the public of the 'proprietor's' claim any notice will serve which does in fact advise it
that there is a 'proprietor' who does claim copyright, provided the notice does not affirmatively mislead.... [A]ny notice is sufficient which gives the substance of what is prescribed
in section 19." See also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406
(2d Cir. 1946); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants 8: Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Glenco Refrigeration Corp. v. Raetone Commercial Refrigerator Corp., 149 F. Supp.
691 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
32 Hollywood Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Dushkin, 136 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Fleischer
Studios v. Ralph Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717
(1935); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
3317 U.S.C. § 5 (1958). These works are maps; works of art; models or designs for
works of art; reproductions of a work of art; drawings or plastic works of a scientific or
technical character; photographs; and prints and pictorial illustrations including prints
or labels used for articles of merchandise.
34 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.4-.15 (1960).
35 It was held in the Superman case that comic strips were "pictorial illustrations"
under § 5 (k), and were not books or other printed literary matter, so that the omission of
the date of publication from the notice was not a fatal defect.
36 17 u.s.c. § 5 (1938).
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his authority...." 37 If a proprietor is uncertain when the work
will be published, he should use a date close to the date when the
work will be printed rather than attempting to guess when the
work will be sold or distributed. It has been held that use of a
date later than the actual date of publication is fatal error.38 On
the other hand, use of a date earlier than the actual publication
date is permissible, for the notice in this case shortens the period
of protection and does no injury to the public, whereas in the
former case there has been an attempt to extend the period of protection allowed by law and thereby injure the public.39
Recent cases seem to indicate that use of a date only slightly
later than the actual publication date is an insignificant deviation
which would not necessarily cause loss of the copyright. For
example, in Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Mart, Inc. 40 plaintiff gave in
his application for registration a date of publication several months
later than the actual date of publication. Preserving proprietor's
copyright, the court said:
"It would seem that, in view of copyright protection for
fifty-six years, a period of four or five months would be an immaterial variance without consequence to the public, unless
there were some intention to secure an advantage in violation
of the statute, or with a fraudulent purpose."
In direct response to this case,41 the Copyright Office amended
its regulations to render only "doubtful" the registration of a work
bearing a notice not more than one year later than the date on
which the copyright was actually secured.42 Although the doctrine
of the Advisers case shows the increasingly liberal trend in interpreting the statutory directives concerning the date appearing in
the notice, use of a date considerably later than the actual date on
which copyright was obtained involves the risk of a subsequent
finding of invalidity.
3717 u.s.c. § 26 (1938).
ss Baker v. Taylor, 2 Fed. Cas. 478 (No. 782) (S.D.N.Y. 1848); Heim v. Universal
Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Wrench v. Universal Pictures, 104 F. Supp. 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
so Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co., 26 F. Supp.
41 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
40 238 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 949 (1957); see also Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
41 See Cary, supra note 25.
42 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (b) (6) (1960).
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Related problems arise when a copyright has been obtained
under section 1243 and the work is subsequently reproduced for
sale, or when an ad interim copyright has been obtained and an
application for extension of the protection period is subsequently
made. 44 The authorities seem to agree that the date when the
prior copyright protection was obtained should be used.45 The
Copyright Office has said registration in these cases too will be
"doubtful" if the prior protection was actually obtained less than
one year prior to the date used in the published copies, but that
registration would not be allowed at all if the period was greater
than one year. 46 When a new edition of a work is published, the
date to be used in the notice should be the date when copyright
was secured on the prior edition, unless the new edition can be
classified as a "new work" for which a new copyright may be
obtained.47 A recent case, Wrench v. Universal Pictures,48 showed
the liberal trend of statutory interpretation in cases of this kind.
The court there held that if a notice bore two dates, the improper
date was mere surplusage.

2. The "Proprietor" of the Work. The name of the proprietor of the work must appear in the notice of copyright. Because of the great complexity of modem contracts concerning
copyrightable material, it is sometimes difficult to determine the
proprietor of a given work. Recent cases have held that one who
holds an exclusive license to use a work for a fixed number of years
is not an assignee but a "mere licensee," and is therefore not a
"proprietor."49 However, in the Superman case the party which
held exclusive syndication rights to the comic strip for five years
was held to be the "proprietor" because only in this way could the
strips be copyrighted.
Some courts have said that when the name used in the notice
is not that of the true proprietor, the copyright will still be valid
since the named person holds legal title to the copyright and the
4317 U.S.C. § 12 (1958). See also note 2 supra.
44 17 u.s.c. §§ 22, 23 (1958).
45 See 2 LADAS, op. cit. supra note 28; WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAw 306 (1917); 37
C.F.R. § 202.2 (b) (6) (1960).
46 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (b) (6) (1960). See Cary, supra note 25.
47 See the lower court decision in the Superman case, National Comics Publications,
Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), reu'd on other grounds,
191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); see also Wrench v. Universal Pictures, 104 F. Supp. 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
48 Wrench v. Universal Pictures, supra note 47.
49 Ilyin v. Avon Publications, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Hirshon v. United
Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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true "proprietor" holds equitable title; the named person is a
constructive trustee of the copyright for the true proprietor.50
This constructive trust theory is also used in cases where there are
joint owners of the copyright and only one owner's name appears
in the notice. 51 Moreover, an "alter ego" theory has been used to
enable the courts to call a named subsidiary the "proprietor"
where the subsidiary and the parent corporation which was the true
proprietor had the same officers and directors; the subsidiary was
said to be the "alter ego" of the parent and without an independent
will apart from the parent.52 However, older cases have rejected
this theory and copyrights have been lost although the true proprietor owned virtually all of the shares of the corporation whose
name appeared in the notice.53
Section 3254 permits substitution of an assignee's name in the
notice after the assignment has been recorded. But substitution
of the assignee's name prior to recording the assignment throws
the work into the public domain.55 This appears to be a rather
harsh interpretation of the statute in light of the generally lenient
view taken by the courts today.
It seems to be well accepted that the use of a trade name in the
notice satisfies the statutory requirements as long as the state
statutes regarding registration of trade names have been satisfied.56
3. The Copyright Symbol. The statute requires that one of
the symbols: "Copyright," "Copr.," or© to be used in the notice.57
It has been held that these requirements must be met strictly, and
that no words other than those prescribed may be used. 58 In light
of the present trend of the courts, it is felt that any symbol or reservation that would give notice of copyright to "anyone looking for
the truth and desiring to avoid infringement" would be held
sufficient to satisfy the statute.59 Of course, a work appearing with
50 Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Bisel v. Ladner, 1 F.2d 436 (3d
Cir. 1924).
51 Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 Fed. 751 (2d Cir. 1923); Maurel v. Smith, 271
Fed. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
52Superman case, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951), opinion clarified, 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1952).
53 Public Ledger Co. v. Post Printing &: Publishing Co., 294 Fed. 430 (8th Cir. 1923).
54 17 u.s.c. § 32 (1958).
55 Group Publishers, Inc. v. Winchell, 86 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
51lScarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants &: Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Palmer Jewelry Mfg. Co., 171 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Trifari, Krussman &: Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y.
1956).
5717 U.S.C. § 32 (1958), quoted in note 29 supra.
58 Jackson v. Walkie, 29 Fed. 15 (N.D. Ill. 1886).
59 See generally authorities cited in note 32 supra.
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a complete lack of any symbol would not substantially comply
with the statute.

4. Form of Notice Required by the Universal Copyright Convention. In works to which the provisions of the Universal Copyright Convention apply, 60 section 9(c) prescribes the form of notice
to be used. 61 Since section 9(c) allows only the use of the single©
symbol, whereas section 17 allows other alternatives, it may be
found that use of notice sufficient to satisfy section 17 will not be
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 9(c).62
B. Defects in Placement of Notice
After it has been decided what form the notice is to take, it
must be decided where to place this notice in or on the work.
Sections 19 and 20 63 provide the statutory language and section
202.2 of the Copyright Office regulations64 provides additional
guidance in placing the notice. Generally, the notice must appear
on the title page or the page immediately following. It is not always clear which page constitutes the "title page"; it need not
necessarily be the first page in the volume.65
Although courts have invalidated copyrights in cases where
the notice appeared five 66 and fifty-one 67 pages within the volume,
a recent case68 granted plaintiff proprietor a preliminary injunction
despite the fact that the notice appeared in his catalog six pages beyond the front cover. This again appears to be an example of the
60 The Universal Copyright Convention notice requirements do not apply to works
of an author who is a citizen or domiciliary of the United States, or to works first published in the United States.
6117 U.S.C. § 9(c) (1958): "[A]ll the copies •.• shall bear the symbol© accompanied
by the name of the copyright proprietor.•••"
62 See Cary, The United States and Universal Copyright: An Analysis of Public Law
743, in KUPFERMAN & FONER, op. cit. supra note 21.
63 17 U.S.C. § 20 (1958): "The notice of copyright shall be applied, in the case of a
book or other printed publication, upon its title page or the page immediately following,
or if a periodical, either upon the title page or upon the first page of text of each
separate number or under the title heading, or if a musical work, either upon its title
page or the first page of music. One notice of copyright in each volume or in each
number of a newspaper or periodical published shall suffice." See note 29 supra for the
text of§ 19.
64 37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (b) (1960).
65 American Travel & Hotel Directory Co. v. Gehring Publishing Co., 4 F.2d 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1925).
66 Siewek Tool Co. v. Morton, 128 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
67 Freeman v. Trade Register, Inc., 173 Fed. 419 (W.D. Wash. 1909).
68 Perkins Marine Lamp & Hardware Corp. v. Long Island Marine Supply Corp., 185
F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
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lenient attitude of the present courts toward the fulfillment of
formal requirements of the statutes.
There have been some instances where the courts have held a
copyright to be invalid because the copyright notice was "dispersed," that is, because one or more parts of the notice were not
"accompanied by"60 the remainder of the notice. In some old
cases the courts were very strict in requiring that the words of the
notice appear together,70 but more recent cases have shovm that if
the various words of the notice appear reasonably close to one
another-at least on the same page with one another in the case of
literary works-the notice will be satisfactory.71
I. The Impact of Mazer v. Stein. The advent of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein12 has created new and difficult problems in the area of notice placement. The types of
works to which copyright protection was extended by that case
were, for the most part, works of copyright which had been converted into a commercially salable product73 which was of such a
nature that the appearance of notice on the product would injure
its esthetic and commercial appeal.74 Products of this nature
which have been held to be proper subject matter for protection
by copyright are costume jewelry75 and designs on dress goods.76
The problem for the proprietors of the above products is to apply
the notice without marring the appearance of the product, and it
is in the many recent cases concerning these items that the liberal
17

u.s.c. § 19

(1958).
v. Rankin, 24 Fed. Cas. 89 (No. 14090) (D. Mass. 1876); Record & Guide
Co. v. Bromley, 175 Fed. 156 (E.D. Pa. 1909).
71 Glenco Refrigeration Corp. v. Raetone Commercial Refrigerator Corp., 149 F. Supp.
691 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Harry Alter Co. v. Graves Refrigeration, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 703 (N.D.
Ga. 1951).
72 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
73 The product held to be copyrightable in the Stein case was a lamp having a copyrightable figurine as a base. See Pogue, Borderland - Where Copyright and Design
Patent Meet, 52 MICH. L. REv. 33 (1953).
74 See NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT 23, 24.
76 Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Palmer Jewelry Mfg. Co., 171 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Boucher v. Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958);
Kramer Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Capri Jewelry, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Hollywood Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Dushkin, 136 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
76 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1960); H. M. Kolbe
Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 184 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 4S7 (2d Cir. 1960); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
60

70 Tompkins

626

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

trend of interpretation of the notice requirements has been most
evident.
In some of these cases the plaintiff attempted to place copyright
notice on detachable tags tied to the product.77 The courts have
been unanimous in holding this method of notice placement does
not satisfy the requirements of section 19 that the notice must be
"on some accessible portion of such copies or of the margin, back,
permanent base, or pedestal, or of the substance on which such
copies shall be mounted." 78 In the jewelry cases, the plaintiffs
placed a small, but legible, notice on the clasps of necklaces and
bracelets and on the inside surface of earrings. The use of these
positions was held to satisfy the requirements of section 19.78 " In one
case where the plaintiff had placed his notice on the clasp of a
necklace, the court held that the notice, although it was small,
appeared where it was customary for members of the industry to
place the maker's name and was "located so as to apprise anyone
seeking to copy the article of the existence of the copyright, and is,
therefore, sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements." 79
Proprietors of products in this area have a still further problem
for they must satisfy the requirement that the notice "shall be
affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the
United States by authority of the copyright proprietor." 80 This
point was litigated in an early case, De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker &
KesslerJ81 in which it was held that the copyright on a painting was
lost because it was reproduced a dozen times on a sheet of wrapping
paper which bore only one notice of copyright. This doctrine has
also been applied to designs on dress fabrics. 82
Recently, considerable inroads have been made on this doctrine. In a case where a pair of earrings bore copyright notice on
only one of the earrings, the court held that since the earrings were
invariably sold as a pair, they were a "single work of art" and only
one notice was necessary.83 This new interpretation has been ap77 Trifari, Knissman &: Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Boucher v. Du Boyes, 253 F. 2d 948 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958);
Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants &: Mfrs., supra note 76.
78 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1958). The Copyright Office, in its regulations, states that it will
reject applications for registration on goods bearing notice on detachable tags or wrappers
which are not part of the work and will eventually be discarded when the work is put in
use. 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.2 (b) (9), (10) (1960).
78• See cases cited in note 75 supra.
79 Trifari, Krussman &: Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
80 17 U.S.C. § IO (1958). (Emphasis added.)
81235 U.S. 33 (1914).
82Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
83 Boucher v. Du Boyes, 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958).
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plied in a case where a copyrighted design was placed on the front
of a blouse and repeated on the back of the blouse. 84 Copyright
notice was placed on a small tag sewn into a seam inside the blouse.
Analogizing this case to the earrings case, the court held that the
blouse could be considered as a single work of art. Although the
courts have not yet held that use of a single notice on an article
upon which a design is multiplied prolifically will serve to satisfy
the requirement that notice appear on "each copy" of the work,
there seems to be no logical distinction, in this consideration, between a pair and a multitude of reproductions.85
The recent series of cases in which Peter Pan Fabrics was the
plaintiff8 6 has been very important to the development of the use
of copyright notice in the dress goods industry and to the evolution
of the liberal view taken toward formal notice requirements. In
each of these cases plaintiff, a manufacturer of dress fabrics, had
placed notice of copyright on the selvage edges of bolts of print
cloth sold to dressmakers. The notice was repeated each time the
design appeared on the cloth. However, it was shown that the
dressmakers inevitably either cut off the selvage edge or sewed it
into the seams of their finished dresses so that the notice was either
totally absent or could not be seen without tearing the fabric apart
when the dresses got to the consuming public.87 Defendants in
most of these cases argued that this application of notice to the
selvage edge was analogous to the application of notice to hang
tags. 88 In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. 89 the
lower court refused to take judicial notice of the fact that the
selvage edge was always covered or removed by dressmakers. Furthermore, the court said that the requirement that notice be affixed
to "each copy" should be construed realistically in a manner consonant with business practices in order to "reasonably protect the
84 Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
85 It has recently been held that a copyright was valid where only four notices were

applied along the selvage edge to a portion of yard goods bearing 16 repetitions of the
copyrighted design. H. M. Kolbe Co. v. Anngus Textile Co., 279 F .2d 555 (2d Cir. 1960).
Judge Friendly's dissent stated that the majority's opinion meant that a single notice would
suffice for the whole bolt of cloth or at least for a whole dress.
86 See cases cited in note 76 supra, and Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc.,
169 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
87 The Copyright Office indicates that it will refuse registration to a work in which the
notice is permanently covered so that it cannot be seen without tearing the work apart.
37 C.F.R. § 202.2 (b) (7) (1960).
88 See decisions cited in note 77 supra, in which hang tags were held insufficient for
use as notice-bearers.
so 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960), affirming Peter Pan Fabrics v. Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp.
292 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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copyright owner and the innocent copyist," and that the notice
used by plaintiffs was the best they could have used without marring the appearance of the article. On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed in a two-to-one decision with Judge Learned Hand 1\TI'iting
the majority opinion. Judge Hand seemed to indicate that one of
the purposes of the statute as a whole was to provide copyright
protection for designs such as these and that this purpose would be
defeated if a literal application of the statute were to be made in
this case. "We do hold that at least in the case of a deliberate copyist, as in the case at bar, the absence of 'notice' is a defense that the
copyist must prove, and that the burden is on him to show that
'notice' could have been embodied in the design without impairing its market value."90 Since the case involved merely a preliminary injunction, Judge Hand stated that should the defendant
show at the trial that notice could appear on the dresses without
impairing their market value, the decision might be different. As
Judge Friendly pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the preliminary injunction is the only valuable weapon in these cases because
the life of the dress design is so short. Also Judge Friendly, unconvinced that the lawmakers had intended to provide the widest
possible copyright protection, felt that the notice requirements
served a valid function and should be complied with. Later decisions,91 however, have upheld the majority view in the Weiner
case.
If the majority view is correct, a proprietor may be held to
have complied with the notice provisions although no notice appears on the finished articles. One author9 2 has suggested that a
better way to apply notice to the designs was available; the plaintiffs could have elicited a promise from the dressmakers to apply
notice-bearing labels to the dress. This reasonable method would
do much to solve this problem if the courts would hold that the
use of a single notice would protect the many repetitions of the
design on the dress.93 However, until this method has been approved, no court should demand its use by a copyright proprietor
in cases such as the Weiner case.
Whatever future adjudication might bring in this area, the
Weiner case is important as a concrete expression of the new liberal
90 Id. at 490.
91 Peter Pan Fabrics,

Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dixon Textile Corp., 280 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1960); H. M. Kolbe
Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 184 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
92 See Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1613 (1960).
93 See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra.
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outlook which many judges have adopted toward fulfillment of the
notice requirements. They appear to feel that the overriding purpose of the copyright statutes is to provide copyright protection to
a broad range of works and that this purpose should not be defeated
by the failure to comply literally with the statutory requirements.
One cannot avoid the conclusion that the impact of Mazer v. Stein
has been heavy upon the minds of judges.

2. Other Theories That Operate To Prevent Loss of Copyright. In cases where the copyright proprietor is threatened with
loss of his copyright because some third party has published the
work without notice, the courts have sometimes turned to the words
of section IO which require that the publication be "by authority
of the copyright proprietor." 94 Obviously, a publication by an
infringer is not a publication "by authority of the copyright proprietor." In cases where a third party has been allowed to "borrow"
a work, or is a "mere licensee" of the work, and publishes without
notice, it has been held that the loss of copyright depends upon
whether the third party agreed to place notice on the work. If the
third party did so agree, his publication is not "by authority of the
copyright proprietor" unless the works appear with the copyright
notice. If the proprietor allowed the third party to use the work
unconditionally, the publication is said to be "by authority of the
copyright proprietor."911
A further, somewhat related, theory is often used where defendant in a copyright infringement suit produces evidence to show
that certain of plaintiff's products appeared in public without
notice. The Superman doctrine96 requires that plaintiff bear the
burden of showing that he has obtained a valid copyright on his
work; after this has been shown, the burden shifts to defendant to
show that there has been invalidation of the copyright. The defendant must then prove that plaintiff was responsible for the
absence of notice from the items which defendant has produced in
evidence.07 This doctrine is valuable to plaintiffs in these cases
04 17

u.s.c.

§ 10 (1958).
Superman case several of the comics were "borrowed" and published without
notice. Judge Hand approved the above theory, citing American Press Ass'n v. Daily Story
Publishing Co., 120 Fed. 766 (7th Cir. 1902). See also Perkins Marine Lamp &: Hardware
Corp. v. Long Island Marine Supply Corp., 185 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
06 198 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1952).
97 Modem Aids, Inc. v. R. H. Macy &: Co., 264 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1959); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Co., 173 F. Supp. 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afl'd sub nom. Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F. 2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v.
United Merchants &: Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Perkins Marine Lamp &:
Hardware Corp. v. Long Island Marine Supply Corp., 185 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
95 In the
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for it is often difficult to prove that the absence of notice was his
fault. 98
3. The Impact of the Universal Copyright Convention. The
Universal Copyright Convention requirements concerning placement of notice are found in section 9 (c). The statute requires that
the notice be "placed in such a mann~r and location as to give
reasonable notice of claim of copyright." 99
Although this section applies only to certain alien authors who
do not first publish in the United States, at least one court has
expressly stated this also to be the test intended by the legislators
for all of the notice requirements. 100 This test is, indeed, very
similar to tests used by many courts today and it seems that the
acceptance of the terms of the Universal Copyright Convention
has played a substantial part in the development of this view in the
United States.101

II.

THE PITFALLS -

SUMMARY

There has been in recent years a considerable relaxation of the
traditional requirement of strict compliance with the statutes concerning notice of copyright, but there are still certain basic requirements which must be met as a condition to obtaining and keeping
a valid copyright. It seems clear that publication of a work having
absolutely no notice of copyright will cause the work to fall into
the public domain. The result would probably be the same if no
word or symbol of claim of copyright were to appear in the notice
used; if the name of the proprietor of the work did not accompany
the symbol; or, in works where such date is required to be used,
if the date when copyright was first obtained in the work did not
appear in the notice.
With the exception of these pitfalls which seem to present a
prospect of certain loss of copyright protection for a work, the
courts seem inclined to uphold the validity of a copyright where
98 The doctrine was especially useful to plaintiffs in the last three cases cited in note
97 supra, since it was used to award them preliminary injunctions.
99 17 U.S.C. § 9 (c) (1958).
100 Glenco Refrigeration Corp. v. Raetone Commercial Refrigerator Corp., 149 F. Supp.
691 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
101 It is to be noted that the Universal Copyright Convention test is whether the
placement used would give reasonable notice to the public of the copyright claim; this
claim should not be confused with the test propounded in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). In Peter Pan the test was whether the pro•
prietor had done all that a reasonable man would have done toward compliance; it was
not important that the notice gave no actual notice.
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the notice used gives "reasonable" notice of copyright to the public, or, in the case of works whose commercial value would be
impaired by appearance of notice on them, if the proprietor has
done all that he can reasonably be expected to do toward compliance with the statutory requirements.

III.

THE NEED FOR REMEDY

It is generally agreed that changes are needed in the copyright
law of the United States, in order that the unwary author will not
suffer loss of copyright due to failure to satisfy "unnecessary" formal requirements of the copyright statutes.102 There are, however,
substantial differences of opinion concerning which formalities are
"necessary" and which are "unnecessary." The parties expressing
these differing opinions can generally be divided into two groups.
The first group desires to retain the requirement of publication
with notice as a condition precedent to gaining a copyright; the
second group desires either to eliminate the notice requirement
entirely or, if it is to be retained, to make it a condition subsequent
to gaining a copyright.103 To evaluate these positions, it is necessary to review the background of the notice requirements of the
statutes.

A. The Nature of the Copyright
The Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress to
legislate with respect to copyrights: "The Congress shall have
power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." 104 This provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in several cases.
In an early case, Wheaton v. Peters,10 5 it was said, in considering
the copyright statute then in force:
102 The Copyright Office sent questionnaires to various leaders of groups concerned
with copyrights. These questionnaires asked whether the reader thought there was need
for change and what changes were needed. The letters answering these questions have
been set forth in the appendices to NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT and U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAw, STUDY No. 17, USES OF THE COPYRIGHT NOTICE
(1959) [hereinafter cited as UsES OF THE COPYRIGHT NoTicE]. See also Finkelstein, The
Copyright Law -A Reappraisal, 104 U. PA. L. REv 1025 (1956); 2 LADAS, THE lNTERNA·
TIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 740-41 (1938).
103 See the authorities cited in note 102 supra.
104 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
1or:; 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834).
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"The statute created a new property right, giving to the
author, after publication, the exclusive right to multiply
copies for a limited period. This statutory right is obtained
in a certain way and by the performance of certain acts which
the statute points out. That is, the author having complied
with the statute and given up his common law right of exclusive duplication prior to general publication, obtained by
the method pointed out in the statute an exclusive right to
multiply copies and publish the same for the term of years
named in the statute. Congress did not sanction an existing
right, it created a new one."106
This interpretation has been often criticized,107 and one author
has said: "Notification to the public of the claim is not necessary
once it is admitted that the creation of an author should be
protected equally with any chattel property of such author; no
notice is required for the latter."108 The view of the Supreme
Court has withstood the attacks of these writers. With this in mind
the purpose of the notice requirements must be examined.
B. The Purpose of the Notice Provisions

The following quotations express the older, traditional view
taken by the courts:
"The object of the statute was to give notice of the copyright to the public; to prevent a person from being punished,
who ignorantly and innocently reproduces the photograph
without knowledge of the protecting copyright."109
"[T]he object of the statute is to give notice of the copyright to the public, by placing upon each copy, in some visible
shape, the name of the author, the existence of the claim of
exclusive right, and the date at which this right was obtained. "110
These views should be compared with the more recent views
of some courts which, although not attacking the basic premise of
106 See also Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909); Millar v.
Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769); American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,
207 U.S. 284, 291 (1907).
107 DRONE, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND PLAYWRIGHT 2, 26 (1879); 2 LADAS, op. cit.
supra note 102, at 10, 740; Taubman, Creation, Copyright and the Constitutional Clause, 6
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 167-76 (1959).
10s 2 LADAS, op. cit. supra note 102, at 740.
109 Sarony v. Burrow Giles Lithographic Co., 17 Fed. 591, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1883), aff'd
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
110 Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884).
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the view quoted above, have emphasized a slightly different viewpoint. In Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson,11 1 the Supreme Court said that the statute was intended "definitely to grant
valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without
burdensome requirements; 'to afford greater encouragement to the
production of literary works of lasting benefit to the world.' "
Thus, it seems that at least some courts will remember that while
the purpose of the notice requirements is to provide actual notice
of copyright, the overall intent of the statute is to provide incentive to authors. This overriding intent should be weighed against
the need for actual notice to the public. Apparently this was done
in the previously-discussed Weiner case.112
C. Retention of the Notice Requirements as Conditions
to Copyright Protection

The group that is in favor of retention of the present system
largely agrees that some of the formalities should be relaxed.11 3
For example, this group would probably be amenable to substitution of a notice requirement similar to that used in the Uniform
Copyright Convention for the requirements of sections 19 and 20
which currently govern the form and placement of notice. Beyond
this, however, this group argues that a system which demands
publication with notice as a condition precedent to grant of a valid
copyright is too valuable to scrap; they feel that "the notice requirements are not too burdensome to those who take reasonable care
to preserve their rights.''114
It is true that the copyright notice is very useful to publishers,
broadcasters, and some manufacturers. In a recent survey conducted by the Copyright Office1115 it was found that a large proportion of the industries polled used the copyright notice in some
way; 110 about sixty percent of those who did use the notice, used
it in their everyday operations to determine whether there was a
111306 U.S. 30, 36 (1938); see also United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1943);
Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 238 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 949
(1957).
112 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
113 Sec, e.g., letters written by Vincent T. Wasilewski, Robert Gibbon, and George
Link, Jr., quoted in USES OF THE CoPYRIGIIT NOTICE, appendix 12·14.
114 Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents on H.R. 10434, 69th Cong., 1st
Scss. 57 (1926).
115 See USES OF nIE CoPYRIGIIT NonCE.
116Id. at 5.
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copyright on the work and to see who the proprietor was.117 Almost
two-thirds of those polled stated that absence of the notice would
make their operations more difficult.118
In addition to the commercial use which is made of the notice,
the courts recognize its value in providing actual notice to the
public of claim of copyright. In a recent case119 the defendant
purchased motion pictures from a party who had authority from
the true proprietor only to license the use of the films. Plaintiff,
the true proprietor, had properly placed notice of his copyright
on the film. The court, denying that plaintiff was guilty of !aches,
found that the notice on the film was an assertion of the interests
of the proprietor, and that defendant could have easily ascertained
the facts by making inquiry of plaintiff.
Another argument often used to defend the operation of the
notice requirements is that a system in which notice was not required would hamper free communication and scholarship, for a
person might be discouraged from using a work for fear that it
was copyrighted.120 On the other hand, the argument continues,
publication without notice is a convenient way for an author to
express his intent that the work be freely circulated and used.101
In short, this group argues that the notice requirement should
continue to be a condition precedent because the presence of the
notice is useful to both industry and the courts, and that any
"automatic" copyright law would tend to stifle communication and
scholarship.122
D. Abolishing Notice as a Condition of Copyright
The arguments of those who desire to abolish notice as a condition precedent are several. First, it is stated that the courts have
a mistaken idea of the nature of a copyright. This group believes
that the author's property right in his work ought to be of the
same nature as his property right in a chattel.1 23 This argument
is supported by showing that only the Philippines, which patterned
her copyright statutes after ours, and four other countries in the
Americas, have statutes that make notice a condition of copy117 Id. at 5, 9-12, 14-16.
118 Id. at 6, 21-25.
119 Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960).
120 Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents on H.R. 10434, supra note
121Ibid.
122 See the review of the basic problems set forth in NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT 55-59.
123 See 2 LADAS, op. cit. supra note 102, at 740.

114.
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right.124 Furthermore, the Berne Convention does not make notice
a condition,125 and the only reason it was made a condition in the
Universal Copyright Convention was that the United States delegation insisted upon it.126 Although the notice is very useful, this
group argues that this usefulness cannot offset the loss forever of
an author's property rights in his works; the price paid for this
usefulness is too high. A further argument, seen very frequently,
is that the notice requirements are antiquated and obsolete, and
that they are not now serving to give actual notice of claim of copyright to the public-the purpose for which they were designed. In
support of this contention a number of instances are cited in which
works appear in public without notice, arguably thereby informing
the public that there is no copyright on the works, when in reality
there is a valid copyright on the work; phonograph records and
tape recordings, it is argued, are not required to bear notice. Moreover, any notice used on television programs is not visible to the
viewer.127 Furthermore, occasional copies from which notice has
been accidentally omitted can appear in public and the copyright
on the work will not be lost because of the provisions in section 21.
Substantiation of this line of argument has recently been aided by
the decision in the Weiner case. It will be recalled that all the
dresses manufactured from the cloth bearing notice on the selvage
edge appeared in public with no notice attached, yet copyrights
were recognized.
Those members of this group who admit that there is some
utility left in the use of notice argue that notice should be mandatory, but that the grant of a copyright should not be conditioned
upon such use. It is argued that the price is altogether too high to
pay and that some other penalty would suffice to create incentive
for use of the notice.128

IV.

REMEDIES AVAILABLE

Judicial remedy of the situation cannot solve the basic problem
in these cases unless it is agreed that the statutory language does
not bind the courts and that the nature of the copyright is similar
124 See NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT 27-40 for a summary of the laws of other countries
concerning notice.
125 Id. at 25a-26.
120 See Kaminstein, @: Key to Universal Copyright Protection (Article Ill: Formalities),
in KUl'FERMAN &: FoNER, UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED 21-28 (1955).
127 See Finkelstein, supra note 102, at 1054-55.
128 Hearings Before the House Committee on Patents on R.R. 10434, supra note 114;
compare the purists' answer to this proposition in Hearings Before the House Committee on
Patents on R.R. 10976, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1932).
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to a chattel right and is not a new entity created by statute. Since
this idea does not appear to be gaining support, the only avenue for
remedy at the present is through legislation.
Many suggestions and bills have been submitted to Congress.120
These plans may be divided into three general categories: those
plans which advocate the continuance of notice as a condition to
copyright, those which urge the elimination of all formalities as
conditions to copyright, and those which favor elimination of formalities as conditions, but support a system for providing other
incentives toward use of notice. The second alternative probably
is not feasible at this time, for various groups use the notice and
depend upon it in their business operations; this valuable aid
should not be taken away from them. 130 It is unlikely that a mere
change in the form and location requirements will be sufficient to
remedy the present problems. Elimination of the notice requirement as a condition for copyright protection is necessary to prevent
loss of copyright by unwary authors, but a strong incentive must
be offered to encourage the use of notice.131 If the incentive is
chosen carefully, the system should prove more reliable than the
present system in correctly notifying the public of the lack or presence of copyright claim in a work.132
129 See

the various proposed changes in NoTICE OF CoPYRIGHT 41-55.
that attempts to pass this type of legislation have failed on several occasions.
Id. at 41-43.
131 Bills incorporating such incentives are set forth, id. at 43-55. To date they too
have failed.
132 The proposal suggested by Professor Harry G. Henn in his letter, id., appendix
13, seems to present the best plan. It follows:
"(1) Copyright notice should be abolished as a mandatory condition of copyright
protection.
" (2) Incentives should be offered for the voluntary use of notice, by limiting the
remedies available against one who uses the work in reliance on the absence of notice.
" (3) The limitations on the remedies available against an innocent infringer should
be as follows:
"a. The innocent infringer should be subject to an injunction only upon reimbursement of his reasonable outlay innocently incurred.
"b. The innocent infringer should not be liable for a reasonable license fee for
the infringing use.
"c. No other remedy should be available against an innocent infringer.
"d. Actual notice given to the infringer should have the effect of removing his
defense of innocence for undertakings begun thereafter.
"Under the foregoing, the courts would have to distinguish in cases where actual
notice was given to the infringer during the course of infringement, between the innocent
undertaking and undertakings begun after the giving of notice.
" (4) a. The form of notice should be the symbol © accompanied by the name of the
copyright proprietor and the year of first publication.
"b. The notice should be placed in such a manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim of copyright.
"c. The notice should not be required in the case of copies published or republished abroad."
130 Note
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CONCLUSION

It seems evident that despite the substantial inroads now being
made upon the old "strict compliance" doctrine, there are still
many existing pitfalls which can cause loss of copyright. It is also
evident that the use of copyright notice is valuable to many segments of United States industry, and to the courts, in providing a
fairly accurate guide to ascertain the presence of claim of copyright.
However, the usefulness of the present law has recently been substantially diminished by court decisions which have held copyrights
valid although the works have appeared in substantial numbers
in public without the presence of notice. The notice provisions
are no longer serving the purpose for which they were designed;
they no longer assure actual notice to the public of a claim of copy. right. Since the present statutes, as interpreted, do not fill this
purpose, the law should be changed to provide that publication
with notice is not a condition to obtaining copyright protection.
Instead, a strong incentive system should be instituted to encourage
use of the notice. If the proper incentive is chosen, the system
would tend to return a measure of confidence to those who depend
upon the notice statutes in the operation of their businesses.
Although it would seem best to eliminate notice as a condition
to copyright protection, it is unlikely that this will happen in the
near future. The recently enacted provisions of the Copyright
Law which brought the Universal Copyright Convention into force
in this country indicate that the intent of Congress is to continue
the present system. At the very least, however, the requirements of
sections 19 and 20 of the present law should be changed to conform
with the provisions of the Universal Copyright Convention, if only
for the purpose of catching up with the recent judicial decisions.
Nevertheless, since many deficiencies will remain, and since the
absence of notice can no longer be relied upon to indicate absence
of a valid claim of copyright, it is hoped that elimination of the
notice requirement as a condition to copyright protection will be
included in any revisions of the United States Copyright Law.

Gregor N. Neff

